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VALUE SYNERGY AND VALUE ASYMMETRY IN RELATIONSHIP 
MARKETING PROGRAMS 
Abstract 
Prior research advocates a positive, linear association between relationship investments and 
relationship performance. Our study challenges this conventional wisdom and advances the 
extant literature by investigating the potential curvilinear effects of suppliers’ different 
relationship marketing programs (i.e., social, financial, and structural) on dyadic perceptions 
of relationship value. From an analysis of 113 buyer-supplier dyads, we found that social 
programs enhance relationship value synergy, but their effect on relationship value 
asymmetry between suppliers and buyers follows a U-shaped curve. On the other hand, we 
observe a positive and increasing returns-to-scale effect of financial programs on relationship 
value synergy and its inverted U-shaped association with supplier’s relationship value 
asymmetry. Interestingly, structural programs increase relationship value synergy and have a 
stronger effect on increasing relationship value for the supplier than for the buyer. In 
addition, we find that structural programs are more effective in creating value in long-term 
relationships than in short-term relationships; therefore, as the relationship with a buying firm 
ages, managers should consider investing more in structural programs to develop their 
relationship. However, in long-term relationships, managers should avoid investing too much 
in financial programs because financial programs are less effective in increasing creation of 
relationship value as a relationship ages.  
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1. Introduction  
The business-to-business marketing literature has long recognized that relationship 
investments enhance relationship performance (Palmatier et al., 2007, Palmatier et al., 2006a, 
Palmatier et al., 2006b). Practitioners, however, are less certain about whether they gain 
much value from their investments in building close inter-organizational relationships with 
customers, as they increasingly realize that “close relationships are not always synonymous 
with good relationships” (Anderson and Jap, 2005, p.75). The high failure rate (30%-50%) of 
close relationships, such as joint ventures or alliances, between firms and either their 
suppliers or customers has led managers to reconsider the linear view of their relationship 
building efforts (Anderson and Jap, 2005). Moreover, the rising opportunistic behavior in 
today’s complex supply chains has created the risk that one party in a dyadic buyer-supplier 
relationship can gain greater value at the expense of the other (Vandenbosch and Sapp, 2010). 
Such opportunism puts pressure on supplying firms to consider not only how much new value 
their investments can create for the relationships, but also how much value they can receive 
compared to their partners.  Given the high costs of investing in business relationships, it is 
critical for managers to effectively tackle these two challenges; however, prior research 
reveals a gap to the extent that it has not completely explained this important phenomenon. 
A review of the extant literature on buyer-supplier relationships reveals three notable 
limitations. First, few empirical studies address the complexity of how relationship 
investments affect relationship performance. On one hand, building on the reciprocity norm 
of social exchange theory, previous research has focused on the positive linear effect of 
supplier’s relationship marketing programs (including financial, social and structural 
programs) on customer-specific return on investment (Palmatier et al., 2006b), and supplier-
buyer relationship quality (Palmatier et al., 2007). On the other hand, transaction cost theory 
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posits that relationship investments can create a fertile ground for harmful opportunistic 
behavior (Williamson, 1975), and “can make it difficult to walk away” (Anderson and Jap, 
2005, p.76). The literature on relationship marketing is unclear about how these two 
contrasting theories together explain the effect of supplier’s relationship marketing programs 
on relationship performance. Second, although business relationship value involves two 
important facets, value creation and value distribution (Fang et al., 2008), prior research has 
largely focused on value creation instead of value distribution. Relationship value is “the 
trade-off between the benefits and costs” each party perceives in a dyadic relationship, 
“taking into consideration the available alternative relationships” (Ulaga and Eggert, 2006b, 
p.128). Indeed, the focus has been on a single side of the relationship, either the buyer or the 
supplier, rather than the dyad (Wagner et al., 2010, Fang et al., 2008). Unfortunately, when 
the party making relationship investments receives less value than the invested-in party, this 
difference in the distribution of value between the two parties can be a sign that value is 
being created for one party at the expense of the other. Third, prior research has ignored the 
contingency effect of relationship age to which the nonlinear effect of relationship building 
efforts might be subject. Relationship age reflects the length of time two parties have 
interacted with each other (Palmatier et al., 2006a). Previous studies consider relationship age 
to be a solid proxy reflecting relationship closeness and stability (Liu et al., 2008, Stanko et 
al., 2007, Kumar et al., 1995a) and point out that as a relationship evolves, trust, 
commitment, control, and other relational factors will change (Liu et al., 2010, Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000, Anderson and Weitz, 1989). The literature still lacks consensus about 
whether relationship age facilitates or impedes relationship building efforts (Palmatier et al., 
2006a). As a relationship ages, both parties experience and gain information about each other, 
which, in turn, helps to increase each party’s trust in its counterpart (Anderson and Weitz, 
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1989). However, as a relationship ages, an element of complacency may appear as firms pay 
less attention to their exchange party (Barnes, 2005). 
In dealing with the above limitations of the extant literature, our first objective in this 
study is to build on the competing arguments of transaction cost theory and social exchange 
theory to propose that there may be potential curvilinear associations between supplier’s 
relationship marketing programs and relationship performance. Our study adopted the 
relationship marketing definition by Parvatiyar and Sheth (2000) that “relationship marketing 
is the ongoing process of engaging in cooperative and collaborative activities and programs 
with immediate and end-user customers to create or enhance mutual economic value, at 
reduced cost” (p.9). Therefore, following previous research (Palmatier et al., 2007, Palmatier 
et al., 2006b), relationship marketing programs will only refer to the programs initiated by the 
supplier to build a relationship with the buyer. Second, in this study, following Jap (1999) 
and Jap (2001), we consider the value created in the buyer-supplier relationship as a “pie” 
that is divided between the buyer and the supplier. Jap (1999) used the term “pie expansion” 
to refer to how buyer and supplier increase their value “pie” by collaborating in mutually 
beneficial strategies, while Jap (2001) used the term “pie sharing” to refer to how the value 
“pie” is divided between collaborating parties. In the current study, we consider relationship 
value perceived by the buyer as the buyer’s portion or share of the “pie” while relationship 
value perceived by the supplier as the supplier’s portion. Combining these two portions, we 
try to capture the whole size of the “pie” (relationship value synergy), and while comparing 
the supplier’s portion to the buyer’s portion, we can see the difference in their shares 
(supplier’s relationship value asymmetry). An increase in relationship value synergy, which 
is a combination of buyer’s and supplier’s relationship value, reflects that new relationship 
value is created for the buyer or the supplier or both. Meanwhile, an increase in supplier’s 
relationship value asymmetry, as a difference in magnitudes between supplier’s and buyer’s 
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relationship value, reflects that supplier’s relationship value increases more than buyer’s 
relationship value. Our second research aim is to examine how relationship marketing 
programs influence relationship value synergy and supplier’s relationship value asymmetry in 
a buyer-supplier relationship. Third, our study aims at examining the potential moderating 
effect of relationship age on the links between relationship marketing programs and 
relationship value synergy and asymmetry. 
This study attempts to make several contributions to relationship marketing knowledge 
and provide managerial implications. First, this study extends the literature on business 
relationships by highlighting the non-linear effects of relationship marketing investments and 
by assessing the effects of relationship investments on both value creation and distribution in 
buyer-seller relationships. Second, the study offers a concept of supplier’s relationship value 
asymmetry that captures the relative difference in magnitudes between relationship value 
perceived by the supplier and value perceived by the buyer. Supplier’s relationship value 
asymmetry (SRVA) and relationship value synergy (RVS) constitute two-sided indicators of 
relationship performance useful for assessing the effectiveness of relationship investments. 
Third, our research enriches the understanding of how suppliers should allocate investments 
into three types of relationship marketing programs (social, structural, and financial) at 
different levels of relationship age. Finally, findings from the study should help managers 
weigh the pros and cons of each type of program in order to develop relationships with their 
partners so as to allow both parties to prosper in their long-term relationship. 
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2. Theoretical background  
2.1. Relationship value: Creation and distribution 
The literature on relationship value has demonstrated that perceived value from relationships 
positively influences relationship performance. Relationship value improves customer trust, 
commitment, satisfaction (Faroughian et al., 2012, Ulaga and Eggert, 2006a), customer  share 
(Morales, 2005), and word of mouth and intention to maintain or enhance a relationship 
(Faroughian et al., 2012, Geiger et al., 2012, Palmatier et al., 2009). Furthermore, Geiger et 
al. (2012) reveal that relationship value strongly influences intentions to switch, search for 
alternatives, or enhance relationships for both buyers and suppliers.  
Many studies had made efforts to investigate drivers and outcomes of relationship value 
long before researchers admitted that this concept was too complex and ambiguous to analyze 
from a static and standardized perspective (Corsaro and Snehota, 2010, Eggert et al., 2006). 
Corsaro and Snehota (2010) stressed that the concept of value is always relative and actor-
specific, and that “there is not an idiosyncrasy of value perceptions, but rather an 
idiosyncrasy of value because no two actors can ever have the same temporal and spatial 
latitude” (p.992). This proposition implies that there is some difference or gap in the buyer’s 
perception and the seller’s perception about how much value they receive from the 
relationship. However, very few studies in the relationship value literature address the 
asymmetry between parties’ value perceptions in inter-organizational buyer-supplier 
relationships (Wagner et al., 2010). Creating new value and sharing this value are two 
competing but inseparable facets that a buying firm needs to consider when making a 
decision about investments in a business relationship (Fang et al., 2008). From the customers’ 
perspective, Wagner et al. (2010) found that customer firms perceive value creation as 
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positive only when they are sharing a bigger “slice” of a larger value “pie”. From the 
suppliers’ perspective, Praxmarer-Carus et al. (2013) explained how suppliers’ perceived 
distributive fairness mediates the positive relationship between their perceived share of 
earnings and their satisfaction. Although Praxmarer-Carus et al. (2013) attempted to use a 
small dyadic sample to compare buyers’ and supplier’s share of costs and earnings, their 
scope was limited to costs and earnings from supplier development programs, not value from 
the complete buyer-supplier relationship. A review of prior studies reveals that the 
relationship value literature has ignored both the creation and distribution facets of 
relationship value from a dyadic perspective. Therefore, the present study offers a construct 
of supplier’s relationship value asymmetry to assess the relative difference in magnitudes 
between relationship value perceived by the supplier and value perceived by the buyer.  
2.2. Transaction cost theory and social exchange theory 
With the aim to create greater relationship value for buying firms, many suppliers invest in 
relationship marketing programs specific to these partners. Supplier’s relationship marketing 
programs included in the hypothesized model fall into three types: social programs, structural 
programs, and financial programs (Palmatier et al., 2007). Plausibly, suppliers expect that 
these investments will yield, in return, a fair share of relationship value. There exists a dual 
logic that buyers may adopt in response to supplier’s given relationship investments: 
reciprocity logic and/or opportunism logic. Because opportunism is the violation of the 
relational contracting norm that occurs when two involved parties do not share the benefits 
and costs of a relationship, this study considers it as the logic to explain how relationship 
marketing programs can affect the difference in relationship value magnitudes between the 
supplier and the buyer (SRVA). Meanwhile, the norm of reciprocity ensures that both parties 
can obtain benefits from their relationship. Thus, this study considers it to be the logic that 
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explains how relationship marketing programs can affect RVS. In this sense, both transaction 
cost and social exchange theories could help explain different outcomes of specific 
investments in relationship marketing programs, which include social programs, structural 
programs and financial programs in the hypothesized model. 
Transaction cost theory argues that relationship-specific investments can become a 
fertile breeding ground for opportunism by partners (Anderson and Weitz, 1992, Heide and 
John, 1992). Opportunism or “self-interest seeking with guile” is one of three core constructs 
of transaction cost theory and includes such behaviors as lying, cheating, or violating 
agreements (Williamson, 1985). According to Macneil (1980), the central norm of relational 
contracts is that benefits and costs in a relationship will be shared between the parties. In 
other words, opportunism, as a violation of a relational contract, may contribute to an 
asymmetry in relationship value between suppliers and buyers. 
In contrast to transaction cost theory, social exchange theory looks on the “bright” side 
of how relationship specific investments can induce gratitude and reciprocity behavior 
(Emerson, 1976). The application of social exchange theory is not limited to interpersonal 
relationships, but can be found in many studies of interorganizational relationships to explain 
the development of business to business relational exchanges (Anderson, 1995, Dwyer et al., 
1987) and to examine variables, such as relational norms, (Griffith et al., 2006), cooperation 
(Anderson et al., 1994, Anderson and Weitz, 1989), and trust and commitment (Kingshott, 
2006, Morgan and Hunt, 1994) that help make a relationship successful. Social exchange 
theory implies that relationships develop over time on the basis of trust, loyalty and mutual 
commitments that arise through parties’ abidance to the norm of reciprocity (Cropanzano and 
Mitchell, 2005, Lambe et al., 2001). The norm of reciprocity is an expectation that, after one 
party’s action, the other party should compensate or reciprocate (Houston, 1986). After a 
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counterpart reciprocates, new rounds of exchange initiate and the process repeats in a cycle 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). These reciprocity behaviors reflect each party’s 
engagement in value creation initiatives, which contributes to increased value creation in the 
relationship.  
3. Hypothesis development  
3.1. Supplier’s relationship marketing programs and relationship value synergy 
According to Palmatier et al. (2007), supplier’s relationship marketing programs fall into 
three types: social programs, structural programs, and financial programs. Social programs 
involve efforts to convey special status and personalize the relationship. They include 
offering special treatment to buying firms, sharing special reports/information or organizing 
social interaction events between two firms. Structural programs offer customers tangible, 
value-added benefits that they find difficult to supply themselves, including electronic order-
processing interfaces, customized packaging, or other custom procedural changes. Financial 
programs refer to offers of direct economic benefits in exchange for past and future customer 
loyalty and include special discounts, free products for incremental sales and cost-saving 
incentives (e.g. free shipping, extended payment terms, etc.) (Palmatier et al., 2007). Figure 1 
depicts the overall theoretical model underlying this study. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized model of supplier’s three relationship marketing programs and RVS 
and SRVA 
Previous research argued that supplier’s relationship marketing programs can enhance 
relationship quality, as indicated by buyers’ increased trust, commitment and satisfaction 
(Palmatier et al., 2007). When the supplier raises their investments in social programs or 
structural programs, these relationship marketing programs will create higher relationship 
value for the buyer and induce a favorable response from the buyer. Social exchange theory 
argues that when one party, a supplier in this case, offers substantive relationship marketing 
programs specifically to a buyer, the supplier anticipates that the buyer will respond by 
reciprocating these investments (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Relationship value for the 
supplier will increase when the buyer can reciprocate by increasing their purchases, lowering 
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price sensitivity, or having other actions that favourably affect supplier’s financial outcomes 
(Palmatier et al., 2007). The buyer’s reciprocity behavior will induce further reciprocity 
behavior in return from the supplier, increasing value creation and maintaining the ongoing 
relationship (Palmatier et al., 2009). Therefore, as a supplier increases its investments in 
social or structural programs specifically targeted at a buyer, relationship value increases for 
both the buyer and supplier; therefore, RVS, the created value the buyer and the supplier 
perceive in their dyadic relationship, increases.  
However, when the supplier invests in financial programs for the buyer, this study 
posits that financial programs improve RVS at an accelerating rate, such that a unit increase 
in financial programs relates to increasingly higher RVS. Palmatier et al. (2007) and 
Palmatier et al. (2006b) failed to find any positive, linear association between financial 
programs and relationship performance. They suggested that financial programs might differ 
from social programs or structural programs. Unlike social programs or structural programs 
which often require investment of some assets (physical and/or human), low to moderate 
financial relationship investments may be easily matched or imitated by competitors 
(Palmatier et al., 2006b). Because low to moderate levels of investments in financial 
programs hardly appear attractive compared to competing offers from many other suppliers, 
the buyer can take such a financial offer from the focal supplier for granted. Therefore, the 
buyer might perceive only a slight increase in the value received from the relationship and, in 
return, only somewhat reciprocate the supplier’s investments such that the supplier also 
perceives little increase in their relationship value. Thus, with little new value created for the 
buyer and the supplier, at low to moderate levels of investments in financial programs, RVS 
will increase only at a modest rate.  
RVS increases at a higher rate when the focal supplier’s investments in financial 
12 
 
programs are at moderate to high levels. Moderate to large financial programs increase the 
difficulty with which other suppliers are able to match. Such attractive offerings increasingly 
induce the buyer to maintain the relationship by reciprocating the supplier’s efforts and help 
the focal supplier secure its relationship with the buyer. After receiving relationship value 
reciprocated by the buyer. the supplier also will be more likely, in turn, to “re-reciprocate” the 
reciprocal behavior of the buyer simply because the supplier’s large relationship-specific 
investments motivate them to maintain the relationship in an ongoing reciprocity cycle 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Therefore, RVS increases at a higher rate in the range from 
moderate to high levels than in the range from low to moderate levels. Thus, the study 
hypothesizes the following: 
H1. Supplier’s investments in social programs and structural programs have a positive 
association with RVS, while those in financial programs have a positive, increasing returns-
to-scale association with RVS. 
3.2. Supplier’s relationship marketing programs and supplier’s relationship value 
asymmetry 
Unlike the linkage between relationship marketing programs and RVS built upon the 
reciprocity logic of social exchange theory, this study premises the association between 
relationship marketing programs and SRVA on the opportunism logic of transaction cost 
theory. As a supplier increases the investments in social, structural and financial programs 
from low to moderate levels to build the relationship with a buyer, the buyer will be less 
likely to behave opportunistically by exploiting these investments made by the supplier. At 
low to moderate levels, such programs are only somewhat attractive to the buyer and thus not 
worth the buyer expropriating (Wang et al., 2013). The buyer is unlikely to act 
opportunistically due also to the concern that doing so would jeopardize these attractive 
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investments from the supplier. As stated before, the buyer will be more likely to reciprocate 
value to the supplier. Therefore, at low to moderate levels of relationship marketing 
programs, the supplier can receive value reciprocated by the buyer, yielding increasingly 
more relationship value for the supplier compared to relationship value for the buyer. In other 
words, at such levels, SRVA will increase.  
When the supplier continues increasing their investments in these programs from 
moderate to high levels, they become more likely to prompt opportunistic behavior from the 
buyer (Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Transaction cost theory argues that partner opportunism is 
highly likely when the focal firm’s specific investments generates a value large enough to be 
worth expropriating and/or because the focal firm has so much unique investment in the 
relationship that they cannot respond to partner opportunism (Wang et al., 2013, Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000, Williamson, 1985). In our case, when the supplier has excessive investments 
in social, structural or financial programs, they become large enough to encourage the buyer’s 
opportunism because the risk of jeopardizing the relationship is now worthwhile to the buyer. 
Such behavior may be especially applicable to buyers who are attracted by financial 
incentives (Palmatier et al., 2006b, Cao and Gruca, 2005). Furthermore, given their excessive 
specific relationship investments, the supplier now cannot respond to partner opportunism. As 
the investor, they will also be less likely to behave opportunistically toward the buyer, 
because they are concerned that their opportunistic behavior may lead to a loss of their 
investment’s full value and future income (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). Therefore, after a 
certain point, the supplier’s investments in social, structural and financial programs will 
provide value for the buyer at the expense of value for the supplier, thereby decreasing the 
asymmetry between the supplier’s relationship value and the buyer’s. Thus, the study 
hypothesizes the following: 
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H2.  Supplier’s investments in social, structural, and financial programs have inverted U-
shaped effects on SRVA. 
3.3. The moderating role of relationship age 
Relationship age is the length of time the relationship between two exchange partners has 
existed (Palmatier et al., 2006a). Prior research in relationship marketing has shown that 
relationship age is a significant determinant of relationship performance such as trust, 
perceived relationship continuity (Anderson and Weitz, 1989), and affective commitment 
(Verhoef et al., 2002). When the buyer-supplier relationship is young, neither party has 
accumulated sufficient behavioral information and understanding about each other to allow 
for accurate prediction of each other’s conduct (Palmatier et al., 2006a). At lower levels of 
relationship age, even when the supplier makes high investments in relationship marketing 
programs for the buyer, the buyer will be less willing to reciprocate because of their lack of 
confidence in the supplier’s intention and in their own commitment to the relationship. 
However, when relationship age increases, both the buyer and the supplier have gained 
greater trust in their relationship (Liu et al., 2010, Palmatier et al., 2006a). Thus, if the 
supplier invests heavily in relationship marketing programs for the buyer, the buyer will be 
more likely to commit further to the relationship by reciprocating the investments and 
creating more value for the buyer, contributing more to RVS. In other words, the rate of RVS 
increase will increase in the case of longstanding relationships.  
In addition, at lower levels of relationship age, a low accumulation of confidence and 
commitment between two parties can induce more opportunistic behavior, especially by the 
buyer (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). When the relationship ages, after years of gathering 
information to understand and predict the buyer’s behavior, the supplier can better protect 
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their investments from opportunistic behavior by the buyer (Deeds and Hill, 1999). In a 
longstanding relationship, the buyer is also less likely to engage in opportunistic behaviors to 
the extent that they have established trust with and commitment to the supplier (Palmatier et 
al., 2006a). Thus, at high levels of relationship age, the negative effect of excessive 
relationship marketing programs on SRVA will flatten. These arguments lead to the 
following hypotheses:  
H3a. Relationship age positively influences the effects of supplier’s relationship marketing 
programs on RVS.  
H3b. Relationship age positively influences the effects of supplier’s relationship marketing 
programs on SRVA.  
4. Method  
4.1. Measurement instrument 
The study adapted all construct measures in this study from existing tested scales in previous 
research. The study measured all constructs with multi-item 7-point Likert scales or by using 
measures derived from such scales, if not otherwise indicated.  
Relationship Marketing Programs The study adapted the measurement scales of three 
types of relationship marketing programs (financial programs, structural programs, and 
social programs) from Palmatier et al. (2007) and Palmatier et al. (2006b). Because the 
supplier directs these relationship marketing programs toward the buyer, the supplier is in a 
better position than the buyer to report on these variables.  
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RVS and SRVA As stated before, following Jap (1999) and Jap (2001), we consider the 
value created in the buyer-supplier relationship as a pie and relationship value perceived by 
the buyer as a portion of pie for the buyer while relationship value perceived by the supplier 
as the other portion for the supplier. Therefore, when we combine these two portions, we 
have the whole size of the pie (in essence, RVS). The study measured relationship value 
using a scale adapted from Geiger et al. (2012), then calculated RVS as the product across 
items of relationship value perceived by each party in a buyer-supplier relationship: RVS = 
RVBuyer * RVSupplier. On the other hand, when we compare the sizes of the supplier’s portion 
and the buyer’s, we can see its difference (SRVA). The study measured SRVA first by 
measuring relationship value, and then following previous research that has used dyadic 
difference scores (Fang and Zou, 2010, Homburg and Jensen, 2007), the study calculated the 
relative difference across items as follows: SRVA= RVSupplier – RVBuyer. Before calculating 
the product or subtracting supplier’s relationship value and buyer’s relationship value to 
measure relationship value synergy and supplier’s relationship value asymmetry, we tested 
metric invariance by constraining the matrix of factor loadings to be invariant across buyer 
and supplier groups. The full metric invariance was supported as the chi-square difference 
between the unconstrained model and the full metric invariance model was not significant 
(  (4) = 7.20, p>0.10).  
Our approach is consistent with previous research that has used dyadic difference 
scores (Fang and Zou, 2010, Homburg and Jensen, 2007, Kumar et al., 1995b). To measure 
differences between marketing and sales units in regard to customer orientation, Homburg 
and Jensen (2007) “used a twin scale: one for marketing and one for sales” (p.130) (which 
have the same items). Then they computed the differences across items in which “the larger 
the discrepancy between marketing and sales, the larger is the difference score, regardless of 
which has the higher and which has the lower score” (Homburg and Jensen, 2007, p.130). 
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Furthermore, the method of multiplication and subtraction of our study is based on the 
dimensional approach, which has been long used to measure interdependence and 
dependence asymmetry in the marketing literature (Fang and Zou, 2010, Homburg and 
Jensen, 2007, Kim and Hsieh, 2003). According to Kim and Hsieh (2003), the multiplication 
method is the dimensional approach that was used to measure the magnitude of bilateral 
dependence (Lusch and Brown, 1996, Heide, 1994), and the subtraction method is the 
dimensional approach that was used to measure the asymmetry of relative dependence (Jap 
and Ganesan, 2000, Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994, Anderson and Narus, 1990). The 
dimensional approach adopted to measure relationship value synergy and supplier’s 
relationship value asymmetry in our study presumes that buyer’s relationship value and 
supplier’s relationship value capture the same phenomenon except for the locus of 
relationship value, and therefore they can be added or subtracted to characterize relationship 
value synergy (Kim and Hsieh, 2003). Supplier’s relationship value and buyer’s relationship 
value can be different in terms of the magnitude and the relationship value elements (Corsaro 
and Snehota, 2010). However, in our study, we are only interested in the relative difference in 
magnitudes between supplier’s relationship value and buyer’s relationship value. Therefore, 
we follow this dimensional approach to measure relationship value synergy and supplier’s 
relationship value asymmetry. 
Relationship Age The study measured relationship age by the length in years of the 
interfirm relationship.  
Control Variables The study considered three control variables for interdependence in 
RVS: aggregate annual sales of the buyer and supplier (Aggregate 
sales=SalesBuyer*SalesSupplier), the product of the supplier’s share in the buyer’s total purchase 
and the buyer’s share in the supplier’s total sales (Aggregate share= ShareBuyer*ShareSupplier) 
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and aggregate dependence between the buyer and supplier (Aggregate 
dependence=DependenceBuyer*DependenceSupplier). The study controlled for supplier’s 
dependence asymmetry in SRVA using three control variables: the relative difference 
between the supplier’s size and the buyer’s size (Supplier’s Sales asymmetry= SalesSupplier - 
Sales Buyer), the relative difference between the buyer’s share in the supplier’s total sales and 
the supplier’s share in the buyer’s total purchase (Supplier’s Share asymmetry= ShareBuyer -
ShareSupplier), and the relative difference in dependence between the supplier and buyer 
(Supplier’s Dependence asymmetry= DependenceSupplier – DependenceBuyer). On a seven-point 
scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree), the study measured dependence using the 
following item: “We do not have a good alternative to buyer A/supplier X in our trading 
area” (Jap and Ganesan, 2000).  
4.2. Sample and data collection 
To validate the measures for all constructs, following Anderson and Gerbing (1991), the 
researcher invited a group of academic scholars familiar with business-to-business 
relationship marketing to review a draft questionnaire. The study developed and modified 
questionnaires to suit the specific position of key informants in dyadic relationships (Jap, 
1999). To assess item clarity, comprehension and time necessary to complete the survey, the 
researcher sent the draft questionnaire to 30 marketing or procurement managers who were 
potential respondents to the survey. The pre-test revealed no major concerns about the 
readability, clarity of instructions and questions, or survey length.  
This study, set in Vietnam, focuses on relationships between firms and their business 
buyers or suppliers. Given the conceptual framework proposed in the hypothesis development 
section, the unit of analysis was matched business buyer-supplier dyads and the level of 
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analysis in the study is the relationship level. Following O’Cass and Ngo (2011), the study 
ensured data equivalence by conducting forward and backward translations for the survey 
between English and Vietnamese using two professional certified translation companies. 
Through a nationwide survey, a professional market research company collected primary data 
for this study. The study targeted sales, marketing, and procurement managers as well as 
sales executives who were directly in charge of dealing with the specified partners. Our 
sampling frame was the local government’s directory database of registered businesses, 
which includes firm information (industries, postal address, etc.) as well as names and contact 
details (i.e., telephone, fax and email addresses) of firm managers.  
The study based our data collection process on that of Wathne and Heide (2004). In the 
first stage, the market research company contacted 1079 randomly selected firms from the 
business directory via telephone to screen their eligibility for the study and to locate a key 
informant in the marketing, sales, or purchasing department. Out of the 1079 firms contacted, 
165 firms were not eligible for the study because they either did not have relationship 
marketing activities directed toward their buyers or because their parent corporations 
determined their marketing activities toward their buyers. Out of 914 firms eligible for the 
study, 354 firms agreed to participate in the survey as suppliers or buyers. In the second stage 
of data collection, in supplier-side questionnaires, the survey asked each respondent to 
identify one random buyer of their key product and to respond to the survey in terms of their 
firm’s relationship with this specific buyer. Buyer-side questionnaires asked each respondent 
to respond to the survey in terms of the firm’s relationship with one random selling firm that 
supplied them with parts for their final products. Out of 354 sent questionnaires in the first 
stage, 125 questionnaires were completed and returned, making an effective response rate of 
35.3%. In the next stage, the market research company sent questionnaires to 125 partner 
firms provided by respondents in the first stage. The number of questionnaires completed and 
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returned by partner firms was 121, for an overall response rate of 96.8%. After deleting eight 
questionnaires because of missing data for key variables or because respondents did not have 
any experience with the focal relationships and were not confident in their responses, the 
study matched the remaining completed questionnaires from suppliers and buyers by using 
code numbers to form 113 matched business buyer-supplier dyads. To assess non-response 
bias, the study used the approach recommended by Armstrong and Overton (1977). In 
comparing the early versus late respondents (first/last 25%; first/last 33%) across key 
variables, the study found no significant differences.  
The sample characteristics show that 95% of buyer informants and 95% of supplier 
informants can personally make decisions regarding the focal relationship or can influence 
decisions regarding the focal relationship. Among 113 buyer-supplier dyads in the final 
sample, 48 dyads (42.5%) have a relationship age of 2-5 years, 49 dyads (43.4%) have a 
relationship age of 5-10 years, and 16 dyads (14.1%) have a relationship age of over 10 years. 
The numbers of employees in selling and buying firms range from 10 to over 1000 
employees (60.2% of supplying firms and 74.3% of buying firms with 10-300 employees, 
25.7% of supplying firms and 14.2% of buying firms with 300-1000 employees, and 14.1% 
of supplying firms and 11.5% of buying firms with over 1000 employees). The sample of 
buying and supplying firms includes various industries ranging from food processing 
(26.2%), packaging and labeling (21.3%), plastics and chemicals (15.6%), building material 
manufacturing (9.8%), electronics manufacturing (8.9%) and textiles and leather (8.0%), to 
distribution (6.7%), and services (3.6%). 
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5. Analysis 
5.1. Reliability, validity and descriptive statistics 
The study used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to provide a thorough validation. The 
CFA results indicate that the measurement model provides a reasonable fit to the data with 
NNFI, CFI, and IFI all exceeding 0.90 (   =140.83, d.f.=91, RMSEA=0.070) (Gerbing and 
Anderson, 1992). Appendix A lists all scale items. 
Composite reliabilities for all five latent constructs exceeded the acceptable levels of 
0.70. Item loadings for all constructs ranged from 0.71 to 0.87 and were significant at the 1% 
significance level, indicating acceptable reliability (Hair et al., 2011, Fornell and Larcker, 
1981). In particular, although some previous studies have argued that the reliability of 
algebraic difference scores may be poor due to dependence on the correlation between the 
constituents (Peter et al., 1993), RVS and SRVA yielded composite reliabilities of 0.90 and 
0.89, indicating that this problem does not arise in our study (Homburg and Jensen, 2007). In 
addition, Appendix A shows good results for convergent validity of all constructs with AVEs 
greater than 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
Table 1 
Means, Standard deviations, Square root of average variances extracted, and correlations 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. RVS 21.87 8.32 0.82 
    2. Social programs 4.37 1.27 0.40 0.76 
   3. Structural programs 3.99 1.46 0.48 0.59 0.81 
  4. Financial programs 4.91 1.27 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.81 
 5. SRVA -0.12 1.70 0.17 0.29 0.38 0.36 0.82 
Notes: All correlations greater than 0.17 are significant (p <0.10); Numbers shown in the diagonal denote 
the square root of the average variance extracted.  
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The study used two different techniques to assess discriminant validity. First, Table 1 
suggests that all square roots of AVE values were consistently greater than the off-diagonal 
correlations, indicating satisfactory discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
Second, following Gaski and Nevin (1985) and  O’Cass (2002), the analysis compared the 
correlations between two composite constructs and their respective reliability estimates, and 
found that none of the correlations was higher than their respective reliabilities. This result 
confirms discriminant validity. Table 1 also gives the means and standard deviations of the 
constructs used in the following analyses. 
Following Ou et al. (2016), Gelhard and Von Delft (2016), and Richardson et al. 
(2009), the study assessed the presence of common method variance using two methods. For 
the partial correlation method recommended by Lindell and Whitney (2001), the study 
selected the supplying firm’s location (in Northern or Southern areas of Vietnam) as the 
marker variable because no theoretical connection was evident between it and other variables. 
With rM = 0.031, the mean change in correlations of the five key constructs (rU – rA), after 
partialling out the effect of rM, was small, 0.02 (Malhotra et al., 2006). For the second 
method, following Podsakoff et al. (2003) and Liang et al. (2007), the study included in the 
model a common method factor that included all the focal constructs’ indicators and then 
calculated the variance of each indicator explained by the focal constructs and by the 
common method factor. The results demonstrated that most method factor loadings are not 
significant and the average variance of the indicators explained by the focal constructs is 
0.65, whereas the average variance explained by the common method factor is very small, 
0.014, making the ratio of two variances 46:1. The results of the two methods indicate that 
common method bias is not likely to be a serious concern in our study (Liang et al., 2007).  
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5.2. Results 
This study tests the hypotheses by using OLS-based hierarchical regression. To measure the 
quadratic term, the study squared the indicators of each relationship marketing program. 
Following Homburg et al. (2011), the study mean-centered all indicators before creating the 
product indicators to enable model convergence and to facilitate the interpretation of the 
coefficients, without changing the form of the relationship. For analysis with RVS as the 
dependent variable, the study regressed RVS on control variables (aggregate sales 
AGGSALE, aggregate share of purchase/sales AGGSHARE, aggregate dependence 
AGGDEP), linear term of social programs (SOCIAL), linear term of structural programs 
(STRUCT), linear (FINAN) and quadratic terms of financial programs (FINAN
2
) in the 
following equations: 
(1) RVS =   +    AGGSALE +    AGGSHARE +   AGGDEP +   
(2) RVS =   +    AGGSALE +    AGGSHARE +   AGGDEP +   SOCIAL + 
  STRUCT  +   FINAN +   
(3) RVS =   +    AGGSALE +    AGGSHARE +   AGGDEP +   SOCIAL + 
  STRUCT  +   FINAN +   FINAN
2
 +   
Table 2 summarizes the results of Models 1-3. Here, the control variables in Model 1 
explained 7% of the variance and only aggregate dependence has a significant effect on RVS 
(β=2.17, p<0.01). Adding the linear term of social, structural and financial programs in 
Model 2 produced a significant effect (R
2
=0.31, F-value=7.99, p<0.001). Model 3 supports 
H1 because both supplier’s social programs and structural programs have positive and linear 
impacts on RVS (social programs-RVS: β=1.56, p<0.10; structural programs- RVS: 
β=2.44, p<0.001). To examine whether there is a positive and increasing returns-to-scales 
association between financial programs and RVS, the study followed Falk et al. (2010), 
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Cohen et al. (2003) and tested whether the linear and quadratic terms of financial programs 
are significantly positive. The  -coefficient for financial programs is positive, and significant 
( =1.76, p<0.05), whereas the quadratic term of financial programs also has a positive and 
significant  -coefficient ( =1.27, p<0.05). After including the quadratic term of financial 
program, Model 3 changes significantly (F-change= 5.40, p-value<0.05). This result provides 
support for H1 that the overall effect of financial programs on RVS is positive and increasing 
returns-to-scale. Comparing the full Model 3 and Model 1 which excludes the linear terms of 
social, structural and financial programs and the quadratic term of financial programs, the 
study obtained a large effect size f
2
 (Cohen, 1977) of 0.43, which confirms the meaningful 
effect of three types of relationship marketing programs on RVS.  
For analysis with SRVA as the dependent variable, the study regressed SRVA on three 
control variables (sales asymmetry SALEA, asymmetry of share of purchase/sales SHAREA, 
dependence asymmetry DEPA), linear and quadratic terms of social programs, linear and 
quadratic terms of structural programs, linear and quadratic terms of financial programs in the 
following equations:  
(5) SRVA =   +    SALEA +    SHAREA +   DEPA +   
(6) SRVA =   +    SALEA +    SHAREA +   DEPA +   SOCIAL +   STRUCT  + 
  FINAN +   
(7) SRVA =   +    SALEA +    SHAREA +   DEPA +   SOCIAL +   STRUCT  + 
  FINAN +   SOCIAL
2
 +   STRUCT
2
  +   FINAN
2
 +   
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Table 2 
Regression results 
 DV= RVS DV=SRVA 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Main effects         
Social programs  1.64
+
 
 
(1.88) 1.56
+
 (1.86) 1.88
*
 (2.22)  -0.01 (-0.04) 0.13 (0.62) 0.14 (0.67) 
Structural programs
 
 2.25
* 
(2.52) 2.44
**
 (2.78) 2.27
**
 (2.65)  0.46
*
 (2.43) 0.38
*
 (1.95) 0.40
*
 (1.95) 
Financial programs  1.38
+
 (1.84) 1.76
*
 (2.34) 2.37
***
 (3.17)  0.39
*
 (2.45) 0.33
*
 (2.00) 0.32
+
 (1.86) 
Social programs
2
       0.25
+
 (1.80) 0.28
+
 (1.89) 
Structural programs
2 
      -0.03 (-0.23) -0.09 (-0.59) 
Financial programs
2 
  1.27
*
 (2.32) 1.33
*
 (2.37)   -0.28
*
 (-2.24) -0.30
*
 (-2.17) 
Moderating effects         
Relationship Age    2.16
+
 (2.15)    -0.19 (-0.62) 
Social programs   Relationship Age    0.91 (1.11)    0.22 (0.88) 
Structural programs   Relationship Age    2.10* (1.95)    -0.04 (-0.14) 
Financial programs   Relationship Age    -1.97** (-2.66)    0.22 (1.20) 
Social programs
2   Relationship Age        0.08  (0.41) 
Financial programs
2  Relationship Age    -1.41*** (-3.03)    0.01 (0.13) 
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Control effects         
Aggregate Sales 0.79 (1.05) 1.19
+
 (1.74) 1.24
+
 (1.85) 0.95 (1.40)     
Aggregate Share  0.11 (0.14) 0.46 (0.68) 0.20 (0.29) 0.27 (0.40)     
Aggregate Dependence 2.17
**
 (2.63) 1.21 (1.60) 1.38
+
 (1.86) 1.50
*
 (2.10)     
Sales Asymmetry     0.04 (0.24) -0.02 (-0.14) 0.01 (0.07) 0.00  (0.03) 
Share Asymmetry     0.19 (1.17) 0.15 (1.01) 0.18 (1.18) 0.26  (1.54) 
Dependence Asymmetry     0.43
**
 (2.65) 0.20 (1.23) 0.11 (0.68) 0.12  (0.68) 
R
2 0.07 0.31 0.35 0.43 0.07 0.22 0.27 0.29 
  R2 0.07 0.24 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.02 
F-value 2.69
*
 7.99
***
 7.91
*** 
6.39
*** 
2.65
*
 5.00
*** 
4.22
*** 
2.67
**
 
  F-value 2.69* 12.44*** 5.40* 3.14** 2.65* 6.92*** 2.28+ 0.52 
Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; 
+
 p<0.10 
Unstandardized coefficients for mean-centered variables are reported 
t-statistics are in parentheses.  
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Results of Model 5 in Table 2 show that all control variables do not appear to have 
significant effects on SRVA. In the next step, when Model 6 entered social, structural, and 
financial programs as linear terms, R-squared increased by 15% (F-change=6.92, p-
value<0.001). To investigate the curvilinear effects of three programs, Model 7 adds the 
quadratic terms of social, structural and financial programs. The result demonstrates partial 
support for H2. R-squared significantly increased by 5% (F-change=2.28, p-value<0.10). The 
quadratic term of financial programs had a negative effect on SRVA (financial programs
2
-
SRVA:  =-0.28, p<0.05) while the linear term was positive ( =0.33, p-value<0.05), which 
supports Hypothesis 2 that supplier’s financial programs have an inverted U-shaped effect on 
SRVA. Hypothesis 2 was not supported in the case of social programs when their quadratic 
term had a positive effect on SRVA (social programs
2
-SRVA:  =0.25, p<0.10), indicating the 
U-shaped association between social programs and SRVA. While the quadratic term of 
structural program was negative, but insignificant ( =-0.03, n.s), the linear effect of structural 
programs on SRVA was significant and positive ( = 0.38, p<0.05), which suggests that 
structural programs are positively associated with SRVA. Comparing the full Model 7 with 
Model 5 which excludes linear terms and quadratic terms of social, structural, and financial 
programs, the study obtained the medium effect size f
2
 (Cohen, 1977) of 0.27, which 
confirms the meaningful effect of three types of relationship marketing programs on SRVA.  
To test H3a, Model 4 adds the moderator, relationship age, interaction terms between 
supplier’s three relationship marketing programs and relationship age, and interaction terms 
between the quadratic term of financial programs and relationship age. Meanwhile, Model 8 
for testing H3b includes relationship age, interaction terms between three relationship 
marketing programs, and relationship age, and interaction terms between the quadratic terms 
of financial programs, social programs and relationship age. 
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(4) RVS =   +    AGGSALE +    AGGSHARE +   AGGDEP +   SOCIAL + 
  STRUCT +   FINAN +   FINAN
2
 +    AGE +   SOCIAL*AGE + 
   STRUCT*AGE +    FINAN*AGE +    FINAN
2
 * AGE +   
(8)  SRVA =   +    SALEG +    SHAREG +   DEPG +   SOCIAL +   STRUCT + 
  FINAN +   SOCIAL
2
 +   STRUCT
2
 +   FINAN
2
 +     AGE +    SOCIAL*AGE 
+    STRUCT*AGE +    FINAN*AGE +    SOCIAL
2 
*AGE +    FINAN
2
 * AGE + 
  
Table 2 shows that the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between the linear 
structural programs and relationship age is significant and positive ( =2.10, p<0.05). This 
result partially supports H3a in that, as relationship age increases, the positive association 
between structural programs and RVS strengthens. However, the results do not support H3a 
in the case of financial programs because relationship age significantly and negatively 
moderates the effect of financial programs on RVS ( = -1.41, p<0.001). According to 
Dawson (2014, p.7), the best way to test for moderating effects is to use an F-test between 
regression models- i.e., the complete model, and one without interaction terms included. Such 
a test in this study reveals that relationship age significantly moderates the effects of social 
and financial programs on RVS (F-change=3.14, p<0.01). Furthermore, comparing the full 
Model 4 with Model 3 excluding the interaction terms between three relationship marketing 
programs and relationship age, the study obtained the medium effect size f
2
 (Cohen, 1977) of 
0.14, which confirms that relationship age is a strong moderator for the effects of social and 
financial programs on RVS.  
The result does not support H3b, which hypothesized that relationship age moderates 
the effects of the three programs on SRVA. The coefficient estimates for the interaction terms 
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between all three programs (linear or quadratic) and relationship age were not significant. 
Multicollinearity did not appear to pose a problem in all models because VIFs are well below 
10 (Mason and Perreault Jr, 1991).  
5.3. Robustness check 
As a robustness check, the study confirmed the results of the curvilinear relationships in our 
study. Given our small sample size, the study followed Dong et al. (2011) and Albers’ (2012) 
recommendation to use the parametric method to re-check our proposed curvilinear 
relationships. The study added the cubic terms of three programs to Model 3 and Model 7 and 
got results for the following equations: 
(9) RVS =   +    AGGSALE +    AGGSHARE +   AGGDEP +   SOCIAL + 
  STRUCT  +   FINAN +    FINAN
2
 +    FINAN
3
 +   
(10) SRVA =   +    SALEA +    SHAREA +   DEPA +   SOCIAL +   STRUCT  + 
  FINAN +   SOCIAL
2
 +   STRUCT
2
  +   FINAN
2
 +     SOCIAL
3
 +    STRUCT
3
  
+    FINAN
3 
 +   
The results showed that after including the cubic terms of social programs, structural 
programs and financial programs, the model does not change significantly (F-change=0.00, 
p>0.10 for Model 9; F-change=0.04, p>0.10 for Model 10). All the cubic terms are not 
significant in both Model 9 (Financial Programs
3
:    = 0.01, p>0.10) and Model 10 (Social 
Programs
3
:    = 0.11, p>0.10; Structural Programs
3
:    = 0.00, p>0.10; Financial Programs
3
: 
   = 0.04, p>0.10). These results eliminate the possibility of a cubic functional form in our 
study.  
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6. Discussion  
6.1. Effects of supplier’s relationship marketing programs on relationship value synergy 
and supplier’s relationship value asymmetry 
The key finding from this study suggests that an increase in supplier’s relationship marketing 
programs can help to create relationship value, but at the same time differently distribute 
relationship value between two parties. Figure 2a illustrates a positive association between 
social programs and RVS. This finding is consistent with the argument of social exchange 
theory that, after an action by one party, the other party should reciprocate (Houston, 1986). 
A supplier’s strong investments in social programs that aim to strengthen the relationship 
with a buyer through social activities or special status or treatment can increase the buyer’s 
reciprocal activities. When both the supplier and the buyer receive increasing value from the 
relationship, this increased value consequently gives rise to RVS. Furthermore, the study 
reveals an interesting finding that as a supplier’s investment in social programs increases 
from low to moderate levels, they decrease SRVA or create more value for the buyer than for 
the seller. Previous study argues that it takes large investments to build up trust and 
commitment in business relationships (Ganesan, 1994, Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Therefore, 
when investments in social programs are only at low to moderate levels, trust and 
commitment are unlikely to be established. Therefore, the buyer receiving higher value from 
the relationship will be more likely to behave opportunistically toward the supplier. SRVA 
will increase with increasing value for the buyer rather than for the supplier when social 
program investment is at low to moderate levels. SRVA is lowest when social program 
investment is at the level of 4.02 out of 7 in the Likert scale). However, as the investment in 
social relationship programs passes the moderate point and increases to high levels, high 
trust, commitment or personal interfirm ties induce greater reciprocation from the buyer for 
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the supplier’s investments. Simultaneously, established relationships between two parties also 
discourage the buyer from acting opportunistically against the supplier. This finding 
challenges previous findings about the linear effect of social programs (Palmatier et al., 2007, 
Palmatier et al., 2006b) by demonstrating that supplier’s investments in social programs do 
not increase relationship value for the supplier, but only do so for the buyer until such 
investments are at moderate to high levels (Wang et al., 2013, Jap and Ganesan, 2000).  
  
 
 
Figure 2 – Effects of (a) social programs, (b) financial programs, (c) structural programs 
on RVS and SRVA 
The effects of financial programs on RVS and SRVA in Figure 2b follow a different 
trajectory. When financial program efforts are at low to moderate levels, they contribute little 
to increase RVS. Competitors can match any low to moderate discount or financial incentive 
that a supplier offers to its focal buyer; in which case, the focal buyer will be likely to 
reciprocate only little in response to the supplier’s investments, thus slightly increasing RVS. 
RVS hardly increases until supplier’s financial offerings become large enough to dampen 
competitors’ efforts to compete or imitate. When financial programs increase beyond a level, 
they make the supplier more attractive and prompt both the buyer and the supplier to engage 
in reciprocity behaviors, which gradually raises RVS. Our finding of a positive and 
increasing returns-to-scale association between financial programs and RVS is an important 
extension to the literature. Previous studies have never found a significant and linear 
(a) (b) (c) 
SRVA RVS 
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association between the supplier’s investments in financial programs and relationship 
performance (Palmatier et al., 2007, Palmatier et al., 2006b). Our closer look at the 
complexity of this relationship reveals that the association between financial programs and 
RVS is positive and increasing returns-to-scale. On the other hand, the results specifically 
show that when financial program investments increase from low levels to a moderately high 
level (5.66), they help to increase SRVA or more relationship value for the supplier than for 
the buyer. However, excessive financial investments above a moderately high level (e.g., 
5.66) can result in a decrease in SRVA, or more relationship value for the buyer than for the 
supplier. This finding again confirms the expropriation effect argued by transaction cost 
theory that the buyer only exploits the supplier’s investments in financial programs when 
they are large enough to be worth the risk of jeopardizing the relationship (Wang et al., 2013, 
Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Furthermore, excessive financial programs offered specifically to 
the buyer can bind the supplier in the relationship so strongly that they hardly can respond to 
the buyer’s opportunistic behavior (Wang et al., 2013, Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Therefore, 
this expropriation effect causes the buyer to seek more relationship value for themselves, 
decreasing SRVA when financial programs are at moderate to high levels.  
The empirical result in Figure 2c suggests that structural programs are the only type 
among the three relationship marketing programs that helps to increase RVS and at the same 
time increase relative relationship value for the investing party, the supplier. Unlike social 
programs and financial programs, structural programs typically require considerable set-up 
efforts by both parties, and their unique offers discourage the buyer to switch (Palmatier et 
al., 2006b). Therefore, structural programs can create a stronger tie than either social 
programs or financial programs to bind both the buyer and the supplier. Under structural 
programs, the buyer is less likely to behave opportunistically and more likely to reciprocate 
to the supplier for their relationship investments. Therefore, RVS increases as the supplier’s 
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investments in structural programs increase. At the same time, SRVA gradually increases 
with more value for the supplier than for the buyer.  
6.2. The moderating effect of relationship age 
The empirical results of this study support the contingent effect of relationship age on the 
links between relationship marketing programs and RVS. However, how relationship age 
moderates the link between structural programs and RVS is different from how it moderates 
the effect of financial programs on RVS. As the buyer-supplier relationship grows year after 
year, the supplier’s investments in structural programs are more likely to induce more RVS. 
This finding is consistent with the results of previous studies which show that relationship 
age negatively affects opportunistic behavior (Liu et al., 2010). Furthermore, as the buyer and 
the supplier work together for a long time, they have an increasingly better understanding and 
quality of communication with their partner, thus the supplier’s structural offer for the buyer 
can be more fulfilling and effective in RVS. This finding suggests that the supplier should 
invest more in structural programs for the buyer as their dyadic relationship ages. In contrast 
to how relationship age affects the association between structural programs and RVS, our 
study reveals that as the buyer-supplier relationship ages, excessive financial incentives 
offered by the supplier become less effective in increasing RVS. Particularly at a young stage 
of the relationship, suppliers often use financial offerings as tangible rewards to attract buyers 
(Dwyer et al., 1987). However, once two parties have established a long-term relationship, 
they look for some durability in the association over time and both the buyer and the supplier 
may look for more than short-term financial benefits (Dwyer et al., 1987). Therefore, in a 
long-standing relationship, financial benefits, which are likely to be matched by competitors, 
become less attractive for the buyer to reciprocate and create new relationship value. In 
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addition, although relationship age moderates the way relationship marketing programs affect 
RVS, it does not influence distribution of value from these programs between the two parties.  
7. Conclusions  
7.1. Implications  
This study reveals several important theoretical implications. First, it contributes to the 
literature on business relationships by highlighting the curvilinear effects of supplier’s 
relationship marketing programs. Although most previous studies found positive linear 
effects of relationship investments on performance (Palmatier et al., 2006a, Ganesan, 1994), 
this study finds curvilinear effects of social programs and financial programs on value 
asymmetry. These ambivalent effects of relationship investments support the argument of 
Anderson and Jap (2005) that “the very factors that make partnerships with customers or 
suppliers beneficial can leave those relationships vulnerable to deterioration” (p.75). To 
develop close relationships, buyers and suppliers are often unable to expand the size of the 
benefit “pie” unless they make unique investments, such as relationship marketing programs, 
to support the relationship. Our study confirms that these investments in financial programs 
indeed help to expand the relationship value “pie”; however, they also become the doorway 
through which relationships become vulnerable to deterioration (Anderson and Jap, 2005) 
when they give rise to relationship value for the invested-in party, the buyer, at the expense of 
relationship value for the investing party, the supplier.  
Second, this study extends the relationship value literature by considering both RVS 
and its distribution in the dyad. While previous studies focus only on how relationship 
marketing programs can create value (Palmatier et al., 2006b), this study makes an important 
implication that bilateral perspectives on relationship value presents a more complete and 
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comparative view of relationship value perceptions than a unilateral perspective (Corsaro and 
Snehota, 2010). Relationship marketing programs can increase value creation and 
simultaneously contribute to asymmetry in relationship value distributed to suppliers and 
buyers. This implication underscores the need for relationship value research to pay more 
attention to how relationship marketing efforts affect both value creation and its distribution.   
The third theoretical implication of this study is to extend the findings of Palmatier et 
al. (2006b) and Palmatier et al. (2007) about the distinct effects of three types of relationship 
marketing programs on relationship performance. It confirms the positive effects of social 
programs and structural programs, and also reveals that financial programs, which previous 
research has never found to have a significant or linear effect on relationship performance, do 
potentially impose a positive and increasing returns-to-scale effect on value synergy and an 
inverted U-shaped effect on supplier’s value asymmetry.  
Fourth, the study contributes to the literature on the effects of relationship marketing 
programs by showing how relationship age moderates these effects. Relationship age can 
help to strengthen the value creating effect of structural programs; however, financial 
programs offered to longer-term partners can induce less RVS than when offered to newer 
partners. Last, the study contributes to transaction cost theory and social exchange theory by 
further exploring how they operate as competing mechanisms to explain value creation and 
distribution. At different levels, relationship marketing programs can follow the logics of 
either transaction cost theory, social exchange theory, or both in how they affect RVS and 
SRVA.  
This study also offers several implications for managerial decision-making. From a 
practitioner’s standpoint, understanding the curvilinear effects of relationship investments on 
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creation and distribution is important given the risks and costs associated with relationship 
marketing. Monitoring the effects of the supplier’s investments in financial programs is 
important to the extent that these investments contribute to increases in RVS, but too much 
investments in financial programs may create more value for the buyer than the investing 
supplier. Furthermore, this study yields an interesting implication for managers in that 
financial programs little contribute to increase value creation until they reach moderate to 
high levels. Thus, low levels of such financial investments are more or less wasted.  
In addition, with the aim at helping managers to make better decisions on their 
relationship investments, the study suggests heuristically optimal levels of social programs 
and financial programs. As social programs investments are only from low to moderate 
levels, the newly created value is likely to be mostly distributed to the invested party, the 
buyer, rather than to the investing party, the supplier. Only after the supplier’s social 
programs pass the moderate levels do they help to increase more value for the supplier, 
compared to for the buyer. However, if a supplier invests in these financial programs beyond 
a moderately high level, the investment can create more relationship value for the buyer at the 
expense of that for the supplier. Finally, the study suggests to managers how the effect of 
each relationship marketing program on RVS varies across relationships of different ages. As 
the relationship with a buying firm ages, managers should consider investing more in 
structural programs to develop their relationship since structural programs are more effective 
in creating value in long-term relationships than in short-term relationships. However, in 
long-term relationships, managers should avoid investing too much in financial programs 
because financial programs become increasingly less attractive and induce less RVS as a 
relationship ages. Overall, because financial, social and structural relationship marketing 
programs impose distinct and complex effects on value creation and distribution, managers 
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need to be careful when making decisions on the allocation of resources across these 
programs. 
7.2. Limitations and directions of future research 
This study has some limitations and reveals some pathways for future research. Because our 
sample includes many small to medium sized firms, the respondents’ personal factors are 
likely to contaminate the assessment of their interfirm relationships. Although our study 
manages to collect data from both sides of the buyer-supplier dyad, the data relies on a single 
informant in each side which may cause problems with informant bias and measure 
specificity (Anderson et al., 2006). Future study can deal with these problems by having two 
informants from each side of the buyer-supplier dyad. Furthermore, although the diversity of 
industries in our sample offers some useful generalizability, this study is limited to only one 
country and culture. Vietnam has the heritage of Confucian culture that emphasizes personal 
relationships (Nguyen et al., 2005). Therefore, social programs that partly involve efforts to 
personalize interfirm relationships might have different effects on relationship performance in 
other cultures. Further study could expand the sample to various countries in order to 
investigate the moderating role of cultural factors in the effectiveness of relationship 
marketing programs. In addition, although this study manages to use data collected from both 
buyers’ and supplier’s sources, the findings are based on subjective data mostly measured on 
Likert-based scales, which need to be further validated by future research with objective data. 
A future study can also extend this research by examining some potential mechanisms (i.e. 
opportunism and reciprocity) mediating the links between relationship marketing programs 
and relationship performance. Last, as there remains a debate about the role of time in 
business relationships in relationship marketing literature (Medlin, 2004), our results should 
be treated with caution. A longitudinal design with a lagged measure would help to calibrate 
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more precisely the curvilinear effects of relationship marketing programs on value creation 
and its distribution.  
Previous studies have found positive associations between supplier’s relationship 
marketing programs and relationship performance. However, this study is the first to examine 
how these programs might have a curvilinear effect on the value created in a relationship and 
the difference in perceived value between the investing and invested parties. It yields 
important implications for both researchers and managers about both positive as well as 
harmful effects of relationship investments, and the distinct moderating influence of 
relationship age.  
39 
 
Appendix A. Survey items 
 Loadings t-value 
Social Programs CR=0.80, AVE=0.58 (1-None, 7-A great deal)   
1. Buyer A often receives special treatment or status from our firm. 0.81 19.25 
2. Buyer A is often provided meals, entertainment, or gifts by our firm 0.76 15.42 
3. Buyer A often receives special reports and/or information from our 
firm. 
0.71 9.34 
Structural Programs CR=0.85, AVE=0.66 (1-None, 7-A great deal)   
1. In our firm, special structural changes have been instituted for buyer 
A. 
0.87 28.86 
2. Our firm’s policies and procedures are often adapted for buyer A. 0.77 15.21 
3. Dedicated personnel are assigned to buyer A beyond what is typical 
for our buyers. 
0.79 17.97 
Financial Programs CR=0.79, AVE=0.66 (1-None, 7-A great deal)   
1. Buyer A frequently gets special pricing or discounts from our firm. 0.81 24.49 
2. Buyer A receives special financial benefits and incentives from our 
firm. 
0.81 24.49 
Relationship value synergy CR=0.90, AVE=0.68   
1. Compared to our relationship with our largest buyer/supplier, the 
relationship with buyer A/supplier X has an outstanding value to us. 
0.86 30.68 
2. Compared to our relationship with our largest buyer/supplier, the 
benefits of the relationship with buyer A/supplier X far outweigh the 
disadvantages. 
0.82 21.31 
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3. Compared to our relationship with our largest buyer/supplier, the 
relationship with buyer A/supplier X makes a crucial positive 
contribution to our firm's success. 
0.81 19.24 
4. Compared to our relationship with our largest buyer/supplier, the 
relationship with buyer A/supplier X strongly matches our conception 
of an optimal relationship. 
0.81 15.96 
Supplier’s relationship value asymmetry CR=0.89, AVE=0.67   
1. Compared to our relationship with our largest buyer/supplier, the 
relationship with buyer A/supplier X has an outstanding value to us. 
0.84 26.68 
2. Compared to our relationship with our largest buyer/supplier, the 
benefits of the relationship with buyer A/supplier X far outweigh the 
disadvantages. 
0.75 13.43 
3. Compared to our relationship with our largest buyer/supplier, the 
relationship with buyer A/supplier X makes a crucial positive 
contribution to our firm's success. 
0.87 30.32 
4. Compared to our relationship with our largest buyer/supplier, the 
relationship with buyer A/supplier X strongly matches our conception 
of an optimal relationship. 
0.80 22.98 
Fit statistics:    =140.83; d.f.=91; CMIN/df= 1.55; NNFI=0.90; CFI=0.93; IFI=0.93; 
RMSEA=0.070; GFI=0.88.   
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